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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
---00000---
COX CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
INC., 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
s·rATE ROAD COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
---00000---
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
---00000---
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Case No. 15499 
This case involves an award of interest by the District 
court on principal amounts determined to be due and owing 
by appellent to respondent on three highway construction 
contracts. The determination of the principal amounts 
owed was made through arbitration proceedings which reserved 
the question of interest, as a question of law, for decision 
by the District court. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Respondent filed a motion for partial summary judgment 
seeking interest on principal amounts which were previously 
determined to be due and owing to respondent in arbitration 
proceedings. The District court granted the motion and 
entered partial summary judgment against appellant for 
interest in the amount of $21,532.24. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks to have the decision of the District 
court affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Statement of Facts contained in appellant's 
Brief is incomplete and not sufficiently detailed or 
precise to adequately and accurately present the questions 
to be decided. Therefore, respondent will state the facts. 
For convenience, the parties will be referred to by the 
trial court designations where appellant was defendant and 
respondent was plaintiff. 
Prior to January 29, 1971 plaintiff and defendant 
entered into a number of contracts for the construction of 
highways in various parts of the State of Utah. (R. 269). 
Plaintiff had filed suit against defendant in the Third 
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Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake county, to 
collect money it claimed was owed to it by defendant under 
several of these contracts, including the contracts cover-
ing the three projects involved in this appeal. {R. 269). 
The three contracts involved here were designated as 
Poison Springs Wash to Trachyte JUnction, (herein called 
Trachyte project); Hanksville to Poison Springs Wash, 
(herein called Hanksville project); and Perry to three 
miles west of Brigham city, (herein called Brigham City 
project). 
Under the specifications covering the three contracts, 
it was defendant's obligation to accurately measure all 
quantities of work performed by plaintiff and to pay 
plaintiff in full at the time defendant submitted the final 
estimate invoices on each of the projects. Section 1-9.1 
of the specifications provided: 
"Measurement of Quantities. All work completed 
under the contract shall be measured by the Engineer 
according to United States standard Measure." (R. 264). 
Section 1-9.8 of the specifications provided: 
"Acceptance and Final Payment. When the final 
inspection and final acceptance have been duly made, 
a final estimate will be prepared by the Engineer, 
based on the actual quantities of authorized work 
-3-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
done under each item scheduled in the proposal •.. 
which estimate will show the total value of the 
completed work and the final payment due the 
contractor." (R. 264). 
In the complaint, plaintiff claimed that defendant failed 
to correctly measure and pay for the work done by plaintiff. 
(R. 269). The Complaint also demanded payment of interest 
on the principal amounts owing to plaintiff. 
On January 29, 1971 plaintiff and defendant entered 
into an Arbitration Agreement under the terms of which 
the parties agreed to submit plaintiff's claims for quanti-
ties of work performed and money due for such work to an 
arbitration panel. (R. 269-273). However, all questions 
of law were reserved to be heard and decided by the Third 
District court in paragraph Eighth of the Arbitration 
Agreement, which provided, in part: 
"Cox and Highway Department reserve all 
questions of law to be heard by a District JUdge 
of the Third JUdicial District in and for Salt 
Lake County as part of said suit, Civil No. 
177519. The rulings by said District JUdge on such 
questions shall be binding on any award made by the 
Arbitration Board, except that such decisions may 
be appealed by either party hereto. Said questions 
of law shall be heard by said District JUdge following 
the arbitration hearings." (R. 272). 
Proceedings under the Arbitration Agreement commenced, 
and after dealing with several claims on which liability 
was admitted by defendant, or the claims dropped by plaintift 
-4-
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and after extensive discovery proceedings and investiga-
tion and re-measurement of work at the project sites, 
plaintiff and defendant were able to resolve most of 
the factual issues between themselves regarding the 
quantities of work done by plaintiff. They entered into 
agreements on the three projects setting forth the quanti-
ties of work done by plaintiff on each project for which 
defendant would pay and the dollar amounts to be paid. 
Defendant's brief erroneously implies that the claims 
on the three contracts were settled by lump sum payments. 
To ascertain the real nature of the settlements it is 
necessary to examine in some detail plaintiff's claims 
and the settlement agreements entered into, as well as 
statements in the record by defendant's counsel as to what 
matters were settled. Each claim and each settlement will 
be examined separately. 
Claims Presented in Arbitration. 
Brigham city project. Plaintiff submitted a claim 
for payment for specific quantities on 15 separate contract 
items. Included were claims for specific quantities of 
work done at specific locations on the project site under 
contract item 3, roadway excavation: contract items 34(I), 
4l(I), 52(I) and 63(I), excavation for structures: contract 
-5-
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items 26(F) and 3l(I), spreading topsoil; contract items 
19(F) and 23(I), plant mix seal coat; contract item lO(I), 
concrete pipe; contract items ll(F) and 12(I), steel pipe; 
improperly assessed flagging charges; improperly assessed 
penalty; and force account work for correction of an 
elevation error. (R. 323-325). The claim on each of 
these items represented a claim for a principal amount 
owing under the contract. In its response defendant replied 
separately to each item on which claim had been made. Under 
contract items 4l(I), 52(I), 63(I) and 34(I) (excavation 
for structures), defendant admitted that it had not paid 
for the wingwall excavation and that money was owed to 
plaintiff for this excavation but the amount had not yet 
been computed. Under contract items 26(F) and 3l(I) 
(spreading topsoil), defendant admitted it had made errors 
in calculations and that it owed plaintiff $1,724.48, 
representing 2,299.3 cubic yards at the contract unit price 
of 75 cents per cubic yard. On the claim for improper 
flagging charges, defendant admitted that it had charged 
plaintiff for railroad flagging charges incurred by defen-
dant during the period of about two years before plaintiff's 
contract commenced. Defendant stated it would determine 
-6-
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the amount of the flagging charges improperly assessed 
against plaintiff. On the force account claim, defendant 
admitted it owed plaintiff $571.00 on that item. Defen-
dant denied liability on six items and stated it would 
have to determine its liabiltiy on two other items. 
(R. 323-325). When the computations were made the amount 
defendant admitted it owed was $19,395.43. 
Hanksville project. Plaintiff submitted a claim for 
payment for specific quantities of work performed on 18 
separate contract items. Included in the claim on one 
contract item, roadway excavation, was a breakdown on the 
quantity of work done by plaintiff in fifteen separate 
areas. Also included were claims for specific work done 
under contract item 5, mechanical tamping; contract item 6, 
imported borrow; contract item 7, compaction; contract 
item 8, class A overhaul; contract item 9, class B overhaul; 
contract item 20, special pipe; contract item 27, untreated 
base course; contract item 28, bituminous material; contract 
item 33, small ditch excavation; contract item 34, loose 
rip rap; force account work for refinishing slopes at five 
locations; force account work for repairing an adjacent 
roadway; and force account work for repairing a drainage 
-7-
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area. (R. 277-281). The claim on each of these items 
represented a claim for a principal amount due under the 
contract. In its response defendant answered the claims 
on each of the contract items separately. 
Trachyte project. Plaintiff submitted a claim for 
payment for specific quantities of work performed on 
25 separate contract items. On contract item 3, roadway 
excavation, work done and not paid for in 19 separate 
locations on the project was set forth in detail. Also 
included in detail were claims for specific work done under 
contract item 5, mechanical tamping; contract item 6, 
compaction; contract item 7, class A overhaul; contract 
item 8, class B overhaul; contract items 10 and 12, metal 
pipe; contract items 16, 17 and 19, structural pipe; 
contract item 25, bituminous material; contract item 29, 
small ditch excavation; contract item 30, loose rip rap; 
and 11 different items of force account work. The claim 
on each of these items represented a claim for a principal 
amount due under the contract. In its response defendant 
replied to each of the separate items of the claim. 
Following extensive discovery proceedings, plaintiff 
and defendant reached agreement on the quantities of work 
-8-
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done by plaintiff on most of the contract items involved. 
settlement Agreements. 
Brigham City project. Under the stipulation settling 
plaintiff's principal claims on this project, defendant 
paid for 8,750 cubic yards of roadway excavation under 
contract item 3 at the contract price of 40 cents per 
cubic yard for payment of $3,500.00. Under contract items 
4l(I), 52(I), 63(I) and 34(I), excavation for structures, 
defendant paid for 467.95 cubic yards at the contract price 
of $3.00 per cubic yard for a payment of $1,403.85. Under 
contract items 26(F) and 3l(I), spreading topsoil, defendant 
paid for 2,298.67 cubic yards at the contract price of 75 
cents per cubic yard, making a payment of $1,724.00. 
Plaintiff dismissed its claims under contract items 19(F), 
23(I), lO(I), ll(F) and 12(I). On the claim of improper 
flagging charges, defendant paid $15,696.58 for flagging 
charges improperly assessed against plaintiff. On the 
improper assessment of a penalty, defendant paid $2,413.29, 
the full amount it had improperly assessed against plaintiff. 
Defendant paid $571.00 on the force account item for correc-
tion of an elevation error. On the claim on contract item 
44, site grading, defendant paid $3,500.00 for work done 
by plaintiff. (R. 274-276). The amount paid was the sum 
-9-
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of the individual principal amounts owed and totaled 
$28,808.72. In its response to plaintiff's claim defendant 
had originally admitted liability on eight of the 11 contract 
items on which payment was finally made. Payment on the 
eight contract items admitted from the outset was $19, 395.91, 
with $9,412.81 paid on contract items originally disputed. 
(R. 323-325). 
Hanksville project. Under the stipulation settling 
plaintiff's principal claims on this project, defendant 
paid under contract item 3 for 13,327.4 cubic yards of 
roadway excavation at the contract price of 28 cents per 
cubic yard for a payment of $3,731.68. Under contract 
item 5, mechanical tamping, defendant paid for 184.6 hours 
at the contract price of $5.45 per hour for a payment of 
$1,006.07. On contract item 6, imported borrow, defendant 
paid for 2,619 cubic yards, which at the contract price 
amounted to $1,833.30. Payment made under contract item 
7, compaction, was broken down into 5,833 cubic yards of 
precompaction for $233.32 and 15,946.3 cubic yards of 
compaction for $637.85. Under contract item 33, small 
ditch excavation, defendant paid for 923.5 cubic yards for 
a payment of $1,385.26. contract item 34 involved loose 
-10-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
rip rap and defendant paid for 1,133.3 cubic yards for a 
payment of $3,399.99. Under the force account claim, 
defendant paid for refinishing slopes at seven separate 
locations with hourly rates for equipment and labor total-
ing $156.00 at the first location, $52.00 at the second 
location, $100.00 at the third location, $75.00 at the 
fourth location, $2,124.00 at the fifth location and 
$400.00 at the sixth and seventh locations. Also under 
the force account claim defendant paid for three pieces 
of equipment for varying lengths of time for blading an 
adjacent road for a payment of $2,124.00. (R. 277-281). 
Trachyte project. This agreement is reflected in a 
letter from defendant's counsel to defendant. (R. 315-319). 
The letter sets forth the amounts to be paid on each item 
of the claim. Payment was made under 17 different contract 
items. Under contract item 3, roadway excavation, claim 
was made for work in 19 separate areas. Defendant paid 
for work in 18 of those areas. The following is an example 
of how the letter spelled out the areas where payment was 
due for roadway excavation: 
-11-
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CONTRACT ITEM NO. 3 
Area No. 1, Channel Change 
125 feet left of station 
1398+00 
Area No. 2, Channel Change 
75 feet right of station 
1122+00 
Area NO. 3, Channel Change 
125 feet left of station 
1199+00 
AMOUNT CLAIMED IN 
CONTRACTORS CLAIM 
399 .49 
1,963.62 
407 .40 
* * * * * 
(R. 315). 
The total paid for work under contract item 3, roadway 
--
AMOUNT 
REQUE§..!t 
399.49 
1,963.62 
147.45 
excavation was $11,877.61. On contract item 5, mechanical 
tamping, defendant paid $329.73. On contract item 6, 
precompaction, defendant paid $191.92. Defendant paid 
$1,002.69 under contract item 25, bituminous material 
RC70 and $404.25 on contract item 29, small ditch excavation. 
On contract item 30, loose rip rap, defendant paid $1,704.96. 
On nine separate claims for work under force account, 
such as claims for cleanup of water damage, replacement of 
pipe and blading another highway, defendant paid $932.00, 
$167.75, $190.40, $1,334.12, $582.58, $105.45, $1,000.00, 
$745.48 and $441.71, respectively. (R. 315-318). 
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In each settlement agreement the payment made by 
defendant was for specific quantities of work done by 
plaintiff on specific contract items, and the payments 
represented principal amounts owing under the contract. 
There was no lump sum settlement of plaintiff's claims. 
On the question whether the settlements were intended 
to include plaintiff's claim for interest, defendant's 
lawyers each made a statement. Mr. Strong, who negotiated 
the settlement of the Hanksville and Trachyte claims, 
said in his affidavit: 
"4. Affiant further states that at the time 
said stipulation was entered into, to wit, February 
15, 1974, it was his understanding that the defendant 
was not obligated to pay interest on unliquidated 
claims and the subject of interest was not considered 
by the parties for that reason. Affiant further 
states that this understanding concerning interest 
was obviously shared by plaintiff's counsel." 
(Emphasis added). (R. 314). 
At the hearing on the Motion for Summary JUdgment, Mr. 
Ford, who represented defendant in the settlement of the 
Brigham city claim, admitted that the question of interest 
was never considered by the parties in negotiating and 
settling the claims. (R. 334). 
Plaintiff had demanded payment of interest in its 
-13-
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complaint in the District court and in the Arbitration 
Agreement it had reserved all questions of law for decision 
by the District court. As to when the questions of law 
where to be presented to the District court, the Arbitra-
tion Agreement in Paragraph Eighth provided: 
• said questions of law shall be heard by 
said District JUdge following the arbitration hear-
ings." (Emphasis added). (R. 272). 
The arbitration hearings have not yet been completed (R.251), 
but defendant made no objection to the Motion of Summary 
JUdgment for payment of interest being heard prior to the 
conclusion of the arbitration hearings. 
The Arbitration Agreement provided that plaintiff's 
claims be filed within 90 days. However, the full context 
of agreement provided: (1) within 10 days all of the 
surveys, original and final cross sections, contour designs, 
cut volumes, mass haul diagrams, cross section rolls and 
field notes on all of the projects would be examined and 
copied; (2) within 90 days plaintiff's claims would be 
submitted; (3) within 60 days after submission of plaintiff's 
claims, defendant would submit its responses with full 
documentary evidence and supporting data; and (4) within 
60 days after filing of defendant's responses the arbitratioo 
-14-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
board would hold its hearing and rule within 30 days 
thereafter. (R. 270-272). None of these provisions were 
adhered to. 
The materials were too voluminous to examine and copy 
within 10 days. Plaintiff could not submit its claims 
within 90 days. Defendant's counsel reported to defendant 
that on the Trachyte project alone extensive depositions 
were taken along with several field inspection trips and 
thorough investigation of documentation. (R. 315). 
Defendant could not submit its responses within 60 days. 
(R. 249-250). When submitted the responses did not 
contain full documentation and supporting data. (R. 323-
326). The arbitration board could not hold its hearings 
within 60 days after defendants response and rule within 
30 days thereafter. (R. 250). 
All of the time requirements of the first five para-
graphs of the Arbitration Agreement were waived by the 
parties. The arbitration hearings proceeded without 
objection. 
The' stipulations on the Brigham city claim and the 
Hanksville claim bear the respective headings "Before the 
Arbitration Board" and "Before the Arbitration Panel". 
-15-
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(R. 274, 277). The letter evidencing the settlement of 
the Trachyte claim bears the reference above the saluta-
tion "Re: cox Arbitration". (R. 315). There is no 
evidence that either of the stipulations or Mr. Strong's 
letter were intended to supercede the Arbitration Agree-
ment. The record contains no evidence of any detriment 
caused to defendant, and defendant did not present the 
defense of estoppel to the District Court. (R. 333-339). 
It is uncontested that the amount of interest from 
the due date to the date paid totals $21,532.24 for the 
three claims. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE WAS NO ACCORD AND SATISFACTION BETWEEN 
THE PARTIES ON THE DISPUTE INVOLVING PLAINTIFF'S 
CLAIM FOR INTEREST. 
The law defining an accord and satisfaction is clear. 
In Ralph A. Badger Co. v. Fidelity Building and LOan 
Association, 94 Utah 97, 75 P.2d 669, the Utah Supreme 
court said: 
"It is stated in 1 Am. JUr. p. 217, Sec. 4, 
that: 'The discharge of claims by way of accord 
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and.sat~sfaction.is dependent upon a contract express 
or implied; and it follows that the essentials 
~ecessary to valid contracts generally must be present 
in a contr~ct of accord and satisfaction. Therefore, 
the .following elements are essential: (1) a proper 
subJect matter, (2) competent parties, (3) an assent 
or meeting of the minds of the parties, and (4) a 
consideration.'" 
See also Browning v. Equitable Life Assurance society of 
U.S., 94 Utah 532, 72 P. 2d 1060. 
The law is well established that parties having 
two or more matters in dispute may have an accord and 
satisfaction as to one of the matters without affecting 
the others. In Blockhead, Inc., v. The Plastic Forming 
company, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 1017, D.c., D. conn., the 
court said: 
"Defendant submits that the settlement reached 
in January and February of 1970 was a complete 
accord and satisfaction with respect to all complaints 
concerning the wiglet case and thus bars any recovery 
by plaintiff. The court finds that the settlement 
covered only specified defects and does not constitute 
an accord with respect to unmentioned problems regard-
less of when they appeared. 
* * * * * 
"A settlement accepted with respect to injuries 
that have already occurred will not constitute an 
accord and satisfaction with respect to damages that 
have not yet accrued. (citing cases). Nor will a 
settlement with respect to some issues of a dispute 
constitute an accord and satisfaction of the other 
issues not explicitly included within the settlement 
provisions." (Emphasis added). 
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Similarly, in Pierson v. Harrington, 138 Ga. App. 463, 
226 S.E. 2d 299, the court said: 
"An accord and satisfaction may be made between 
the parties pro tanto ... the parties may make an 
accord and satisfaction or what in law amounts to 
an accord and satisfaction, as to one or more of 
these demands without affecting the others. 
* * * * * 
" ••• Where there is no agreement to settle all 
disputes arising from the contract a satisfaction 
does not result, although money is demanded and 
received." 
Again, in Redman Development Corp. v. Pollard, 131 Ga. 
App. 708, 206 S.E. 2d 605, it was held: 
"The settlement of the extra work of $60,089.27 
for $32,000 was in the nature of an accord and 
satisfaction of this part of the contract when the 
letter agreement and change order was signed by 
the parties, although $3,200 was withheld pending 
completion of the contract. However, this was not 
an accord and satisfaction of the entire transaction 
between the parties, but was limited to the items 
going to make up the $60,089.27 above mentioned." 
(Emphasis added). 
Applying these rules to the facts of the instant 
case it is apparent that there was no accord and satis-
faction on plaintiff's claim to interest. The only subject 
matter of the stipulation and the agreement set forth in 
Mr. Strong's letter was payment of principal amounts owed 
for specific quantities of work performed by plaintiff under 
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various contract items. (R. 274-276, 277-281, 315-319). 
The parties had a meeting of the minds only on payment 
for such quantities of work which were payment of principal. 
(R. 274-276, 277-281, 315-319). Mr. strong said that 
the subject of interest was not considered by the parties 
in agreeing on the quantities of work to be paid for on 
the Hanksville project and Trachyte project. (R. 314). 
Mr. Ford admitted that the question of interest was never 
considered by the parties in negotiating and settling the 
principal claims on the Brigham city project. (R. 334). 
In its Complaint in the District court plaintiff 
demanded that defendant pay the principal amounts owing 
and interest on such principal amounts. There were two 
matters in dispute between plaintiff and defendant: first, 
defendant's liability on the principal claims and, second, 
defendant's liability to pay interest. Under the Arbitra-
tion Agreement the first dispute, that of defendant's 
liability to pay for the principal claims, was submitted 
to the arbitration proceedings while the second dispute, 
that of defendant's liability to pay interest, was reserved 
as a question of law, for decision by the Third District 
Court. (R. 269-273). An accord and satisfaction was 
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reached as to the claims for principal payments. However, 
this accord and satisfaction as to the claims for payment 
of principal does not act as an accord and satisfaction 
on the second dispute, plaintiff's claim for payment of 
interest. 
The elements requiring an agreed subject matter and a 
meeting of the minds set out in Ralph A. Badger co. v. 
Fidelity Building and Loan Association, supra, and the 
express rules stated in Pierson v. Harrington, supra; 
Redman Development Corp. v. Pollard, supra; and Blockhead, 
Inc., v. The Plastic Forming company, Inc., supra, support 
the trial court's decision that there was no accord and 
satisfaction as to plaintiff's claim for interest. 
POINT II 
THE QUESTION OF PLAINTIFF'S RIGHT TO 
INTEREST WAS A QUESTION OF LAW RESERVED FOR 
DECISION BY THE DISTRICT COURT. 
In its Complaint filed in the District court, plaintiff 
demanded payment of interest. The Arbitration Agreement in 
Paragraph Eighth states, in part: 
"Cox and Highway Department reserve all 
questions of law to be heard by a District 
-20-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
JUdge of the Third JUdicial District in and 
for Salt Lake County as part of said suit, 
Civil No. 177519. . . " (R. 2 72) . 
It is well established that whether a party is entitled 
to payment of interest is a question of law. In ~ 
Lumber co., v. A. A. Clark Co., 53 Utah 336, 178 Pac. 
764, a school board entered into a contract for the construe-
tion of a building. At the time the building was completed 
the school board failed to make payment. The trial court 
refused to compel the school board to pay interest. The 
Utah Supreme court reversed that decision and required that 
interest be paid at the legal rate from the date due until 
paid. The Court said: 
" ... It is not a question of the school board 
agreeing to pay interest either by warrant or other-
wise. It is a guestion of its duty on one side and 
the right of a creditor on the other. It is a right 
that the statute gives to any one who has money due 
and who is unable to collect the same. The school 
board in this case accepted the building. Presumably 
it had the use of it for the purpose for which it 
was erected and had continued to use it since it was 
accepted. Public policy, it seems to us, should 
require a public corporation to meet its obligations 
legally authorized whenever due, and upon failure to 
do so that it be subjected to the same duty as 
private individuals - to reimburse the creditor for 
his forebearance or delay in receiving what is his 
due." (Emphasis added). 
In Uinta Pipeline corporation v. White Superior co., 
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546 P. 2d 885, the trial court refused to allow interest 
prior to the date of judgment. The Utah Supreme Court 
reversed and ruled that pre-judgment interest should have 
been allowed as a matter of law. Recently this court 
applied the rule to defendant herein in the case of Jack 
B. Parson construction company v. State of Utah, 552 P. 
2d 107, where the Utah State Road Commission was required 
as a matter of law to pay pre-judgment interest on princi-
pal amounts found due under a highway construction contract, 
POINT III 
A. THE CONTENTION THAT INTEREST SHOULD NOT 
BE ALLOWED BECAUSE DEFENDANT HAD TRADITIONALLY 
REFUSED TO PAY INTEREST IS WITHOUT MERIT. 
B. THERE IS NO BASIS IN FACT OR LAW THAT WOULD 
PERMIT TERMINATING INTEREST AS OF APRIL 29, 1971. 
Defendant's second argument consists of two parts 
which will be addressed separately. 
A. Defendant argues in its brief that: 
"Respondent well knows that the State had tradi-
tionally not paid interest on claims of this nature. 
Counsel for the parties had discussed this on numerous 
occasions and the assertion of Appellant's counsel 
that this was in fact the understanding of Respondent's 
counsel is unchallenged." (Appellant's Brief, page 8). 
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From this statement defendant argues that since the state 
traditionally had refused to pay interest at the time the 
settlement agreements were entered into, it should not 
have to pay interest now on the principal amounts that 
were due and owing to plaintiff. 
Defendant's argument fails to consider the facts of 
this case relative to plaintiff's claim for interest and 
the applicable law. 
Plaintiff filed a Complaint in the District court in 
which it demanded payment of the principal sums owing and 
interest thereon. The arbitration proceedings were 
entered into to find the amount of principal owing to 
plaintiff for work it had done. The Arbitration Agreement 
in paragraph Eighth specifically reserved all questions of 
law for decision by the District Court. The agreement 
states: 
"Cox and Highway Department reserve all questions 
of law to be heard by a District JUdge of the Third 
Judicial District in and for Salt Lake County as 
part of said suit, civil No. 177519 ••. " (R. 272). 
As demonstrated above in Point II, the question of plaintiff's 
right to receive interest was a question of law. 
Furthermore, both of defendant's counsel, Mr. Strong 
and Mr. Ford, admitted that the subject of interest was 
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never discussed or considered by the parties in the settle-
ment negotiations. (R. 314, 344). 
In summary, the facts are that plaintiff made claim 
for interest in the District Court action. An Arbitration 
Agreement was entered into to determine the principal 
amounts owing and expressly reserved plaintiff's claim for 
interest for decision by the District Court. The settle-
ments of the claims for principal payment were entered 
into, and in those negotiations the question of plaintiff's 
right to interest was never considered. Pursuant to the 
Arbitration Agreement plaintiff submitted its claim for 
interest as a question of law to the District Court. 
The fact that defendant misapprehended the law cannot 
affect plaintiff's legal right to interest. Plaintiff 
asserted that right from the outset, reserved it for 
decision by the District court, did not settle its claim 
for interest in settling the claims for principal, and 
pursued its right to payment of interest in the District 
Court. 
The law is clear that the right to payment of interest 
is a legal right which attaches upon the debtor's failure 
to pay money when it is due and owing. As noted in Baker 
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Lumber Co. v. A. A. Clark co., supra: 
"It is not a question of the school board 
agreeing to pay interest either by warrant or other-
wise. It is a question of its duty on one side and 
the right of a creditor on the other. It is a right 
that the statute gives to any one who has money due 
and who is unable to collect the same." 
In Puget sound Pulp and Timber co. v. O'Reilly, 239 F. 2d 
607, c.A. wash., the court said: 
"Interest on money detained after it is due and 
payable is recoverable as a matter of legal right." 
As noted in Baker, supra, it is not a question of defendant 
agreeing to pay interest, it is an obligation imposed by 
law. 
Under the facts and law the claim that defendant had 
traditionally refused to pay interest cannot defeat 
plaintiff's legal right to receive interest. 
B. Defendant also argues in its second point that 
interest should be terminated as of April 29, 1971, 90 
days after the Arbitration Agreement was entered into, 
because plaintiff had not filed its claims with the 
arbitration board within that time. 
There is no basis in fact, law or equity in this 
position. The interest attached to money defendant owed 
to plaintiff. Defendant had the obligation under section 
1-9.1 and section 1-9.8 of the contract to accurately 
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measure the quantity of work done by plaintiff and to 
pay plaintiff in full for that work. (R. 264). Defendant 
could have paid plaintiff what it owed at any time and by 
that payment terminated the interest. 
Defendant's argument ignores other material and 
relevant facts. The first five paragraphs of the Arbitra-
tion Agreement contain time requirements. (R. 270-272). 
The first paragraph required that all original and final 
surveys, original and final cross sections, cut volumes, 
mass haul diagrams, cross section rolls and field notes 
on nine highway construction projects be examined and copied 
within 10 days. This proved to be impossible because of 
the sheer volume of material. The second paragraph required 
that plaintiff submit its claims in writing with full 
documentation within 90 days after receipt of the documents 
described in the first paragraph. Plaintiff was unable to 
submit its claims within the 90 day period, and defendant 
made no objection. The third paragraph required defendant 
to submit its response in writing with full documentation 
and supporting data within 60 days after receipt of 
plaintiff's claims. Defendant was not able to comply with 
this provision. (R. 249-250). In fact, defendant's response 
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on the Brigham City claim not only fails to contain full 
documentation and supporting data, but even on eight contract 
items on which it admitted it owed plaintiff money it had 
not yet computed the amounts on five of those items and on 
the other three admitted owing the full sum claimed by 
plaintiff. (R. 323-326). This response was filed May 
31, 1974 (R. 326), while the final estimate invoice had 
been delivered October 5, 1967. (R. 266). On the five items 
which it admitted it owed but hadn't determined the amount, 
defendant had gone almost seven years without computing the 
amounts it owed on contract items it admitted owing. In 
addition, defendant had gone seven years without paying 
the other three items upon which it admitted owing the full 
amount claimed by plaintiff. The total amount owed on these 
admitted items was $19,395.43. (R. 274-276). 
The fourth and fifth paragraphs require the arbitration 
board to hold a hearing within 60 days after receipt of 
defendant's response and render a decision within 30 days 
after the hearing. These time requirements were not adhered 
to. (R. 250). 
None of the time requirements in the Arbitration 
Agreement were adhered to and all were waived by the 
parties. No objection was made by either side at the time. 
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The reason for the inability of all of the parties to meet 
the time requirements of the agreement is set forth in 
Mr. Strong's letter to defendant dated February 3, 1973. 
This letter was written two years after the Arbitration 
Agreement was entered into and contains no objection or 
reference to any of the time provisions of the agreement. 
The letter deals with only one of the nine contracts 
subject to the Arbitration Agreement, and states with 
reference to that one: 
"Extensive depositions were taken on the project 
which I have reported to you along with several 
field inspection trips and an arbitration hearing 
on three of the claims •••• However, the following 
claims have been thoroughly investigated and review-
ed by myself and the project engineer ••• " (R. 315). 
There is no legal, factual or equitable basis for terminating 
interest at April 29, 1971. As noted in the cases above, 
interest runs from the time money is due until it is paid. 
POINT IV 
THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS DO NOT 
CREATE AN AMBIGUITY. 
Defendant argues that the settlement agreements may 
create an ambiguity as to whether they were intended to 
settle plaintiff's claim for interest. Defendant bases 
this argument on the fact that the agreements fail to 
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specifically refer to interest. 
The Arbitration Agreement and settlement agreements 
have been examined in some detail above. As noted in 
Big Butte Ranch, Inc., v. Marjorie R. Holm, et al, case 
No. 14630, this court stated: 
" ••• to ascertain the meaning of the agreement 
the court should first examine the language of the 
instruments and accord to it the weight and effect 
which it may show was intended • " 
There is no ambiguity in the language of the agreements. 
Plaintiff had demanded payment of principal amounts owed 
and interest thereon in its complaint in District court. 
The Arbitration Agreement was entered into to resolve 
plaintiff's claim for principal amounts owing under the 
contracts, and as quoted above, in paragraph Eighth the 
parties specifically reserved all question of law for 
decision by the District court. (R. 272). Plaintiff's 
right to payment of interest was a question of law so 
reserved and was never involved in the arbitration proceedings. 
Defendant's two attorneys both stated that interest was 
never considered by the parties in negotiating the settlements. 
(R. 314, 344). 
The settlement agreements were entered into pursuant to 
the Arbitration Agreement and as part of the arbitration 
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proceedings. The two stipulations bear the respective 
headings "Before the Arbitration Panel" (R. 277) and 
"Before the Arbitration Board". (R. 274). The letter 
reflecting the agreement on the Trachyte project bears the 
reference above the salutation "Re: cox Arbitration". 
(R. 315). The content of this letter is nearly identical 
in substance with the content of the two stipulations and, 
contrary to the statement in defendant's brief, this 
letter was drafted by Mr. Strong, an attorney for defendant. 
The settlement agreements are very specific with 
reference to exactly what they settle between the parties. 
For example, on two typical items the Brigham City stipula-
tion states: 
"EXCAVATION FOR STRUCTURES, UNCLASSIFIED 
"Disposition 
"Defendant will pay for an 
additional 467.95 cubic 
yards at the contract 
unit price of $3.00 per 
yard. 
SPREADING TOPSOIL 
"Disposition 
"Defendant will pay for an 
additional 2,298.67 cubic 
yards at the contract unit 
price of 75 cents per cubic 
yard. (R. 274-275). 
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Every single item for which defendant paid under the three 
settlement agreements was set forth in the same kind of 
detail. (R. 274-276; 277-281; 315-319). 
Each item paid for in the settlement agreements 
represented a specific quantity of work done by plaintiff 
under the respective contracts and represented principal 
payments due to plaintiff. Defendant quotes a cover letter 
on the Brigham City stipulation which states: 
"I believe the enclosed stipulation sets forth 
our settlement on the Brigham City claim •.•• (R. 327). 
The stipulation which was enclosed clearly was a settlement 
of plaintiff's principal claims on the contract items set 
forth in the stipulation. (R. 274-276). As noted above, 
plaintiff's claim for interest had been reserved for 
decision by the Third District court. 
The proceedings were carried out exactly as contemplated 
by the Arbitration Agreement. The settlements of the 
principal claims were made in the arbitration proceedings 
and plaintiff's claim for interest was decided by the District 
Court. 
POINT V 
THE THREE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS WERE ENTERED 
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INTO AS PART OF THE ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS AND 
DID NOT SUPERCEDE THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT. 
The three settlement agreements were entered into as 
part of the arbitration proceedings. As noted above, the 
stipulation on the Brigham City project bore the heading 
"Before the Arbitration Board" (R. 274): the stipulation 
on the Hanksville project had the caption "Before the 
Arbitration Panel" (R. 277); and the letter evidencing the 
agreement on the Trachyte project had the reference "Re: 
cox Arbitration". (R. 315). 
Since the settlement agreements were specifically part 
of the arbitration proceedings there is no factual or legal 
basis for defendant's claim that the Arbitration Agreement 
was superceded. 
POINT VI 
DEFENDANT FAILED TO PRESENT ITS CLAIM OF 
ESTOPPEL TO THE DISTRICT COURT AND IS THEREFORE 
PRECLUDED FROM RAISING THE QUESTION ON APPEAL. 
Defendant failed to present its claim of estoppel 
to the District court. (R. 333-339). Utah law provides 
that a party cannot present a claim or defense on appeal 
to the Supreme Court which has not first been presented to 
the trial court for its decision. In the case of ~ 
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Jones' Estate, 99 Utah 373, 104 P. 2d 210, the court said: 
"Administratrix raises for the first time in 
her appeal the Statute of Limitation and laches as 
defenses against the tax. The Statute of Limitation 
and laches are affirmative defenses which must be 
pleaded. (citing cases). It appears that these 
defenses were never raised in the district court nor 
even referred to in the assignment of error. They 
cannot now be raised on appeal." 
Estoppel is a defense which must be pleaded. Collett v. 
Goodrich, 119 Utah 662, 231 P. 2d 730. In Mathis v. Madsen, 
1 Utah 2d 46, 261 P. 2d 952, the defense of res judicata 
was presented for the first time on appeal. The court 
refused to consider the defense and said: 
" ••• nor is it our perogative to determine 
the question of res judicata before it is presented 
to a lower court." 
Similarly, in Radley v. Smith, 6 Utah 2d 314, 313 P. 2d 
465, the court refused to consider the defense of illegality 
of a contract which was not raised in the trial court. 
The question of estoppel is not properly before the 
court on this appeal and Point v of defendant's brief 
should be disregarded. 
POINT VII 
PLAINTIFF rs NOT ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING 
ITS CLAIM FOR INTEREST. 
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Plaintiff is not estopped from asserting its claim for 
interest herein. Plaintiff followed the express provisions 
of the arbitration proceedings in presenting its claim for 
interest on these projects. Claim was made for payment of 
interest in the Complaint in the District court. In the 
Arbitration Agreement the decision on the claim for interest 
was reserved to the District Court. As to the timing of 
the submission of the claim for interest to the District 
court, paragraph Eighth of the Arbitration Agreement 
provided: 
" •• Said question of law shall be heard by 
said judge following the arbitration hearings." 
(R. 272). 
The arbitration hearings are not yet complete. (R. 251). 
Defendant could have argued in District court that plaintiff's 
motion for the award of interest was premature, but it failed 
to do so. 
The fundamental element of estoppel is detriment or 
injury to the party claiming the estoppel. Easton v. Wycoff, 
4 Utah 2d 386, 295 P. 2d 332; Miglii:lccio v. Davis, 120 Utah 
1, 232 P. 2d 195; and cook v. cook, 110 Utah 406, 174 P. 2d 
434. There is no evidence of any injury or detriment to 
defendant arising from plaintiff's claiming interest. The 
money paid to plaintiff was admitted by defendant's counsel 
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to be solely for principal amounts due and owing under 
the contract which defendant was liable to pay. 
rt is difficult to understand defendant's claim of 
estoppel against plaintiff's claim for interest. Estoppel 
is based upon equity. The record shows that on the Brigham 
city project alone defendant withheld from plaintiff the 
principal sum of $19,395.43, which it admitted from the 
outset is owed plaintiff for a period of nearly seven years. 
(R. 274-276, 323-326). Defendant cannot claim the protec-
tion of equity against paying interest on this sum. 
There is no factual or legal basis for the defense 
that plaintiff is estopped from asserting its claim for 
interest. 
CONCLUSION 
rt is respectfully submitted that the Partial summary 
JUdgment entered by the District court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
John F. Piercey 
Attorney for Respondent 
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